



# Managers and productivity differences <sup>☆</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

We document that for a group of high-income countries the life-cycle earnings growth of managers relative to non-managers is positively correlated with output per worker. We interpret this evidence through the lens of an equilibrium life-cycle, span-of-control model where managers invest in their skills. We use the model to quantify the importance of exogenous productivity differences and the size-dependent distortions emphasized in the misallocation literature. Our findings indicate that such distortions are critical to generate the observed differences in the growth of relative managerial earnings across countries. Distortions that halve the growth of relative managerial earnings, a move from the U.S. to Italy in our data, lead to a reduction in managerial quality of 27% and to a reduction in output of about nearly 7% – more than half of the observed gap between the U.S. and Italy. Cross-country variation in distortions accounts for about 42% of the cross-country variation in output per worker gap with the U.S.

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## 1. Introduction

Development accounting exercises conclude that productivity differences are central in understanding why some countries are richer than others (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Prescott, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005). What does determine cross country productivity differences?

A growing literature emphasizes differences in management practices as a source of productivity differences; see Bloom and Van Reenen (2011) and Bloom et al. (2016), among others. Management practices differ greatly, both across countries and across firms within a given country, and better management practices are associated with better performance (total

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factor productivity, profitability, survival etc.). U.S. firms on average have the best management practices, and the quality of management declines rather sharply as one moves to poorer countries.

In this paper, we present novel evidence on the earnings of managers and their relation with output per worker. We first document that age-earnings profiles of managers differ non-trivially across countries. Using microdata for a set of high-income countries, we show that earnings of managers grow much faster than the earnings of individuals who have non-managerial occupations in most countries. In the United States, the earnings of managers grow by about 75% during prime working ages (between ages 25–29 to 50–54), while the earnings growth for non-managers is about 40%. This gap is weaker in other countries in our sample. In Belgium, for instance, earnings growth of managers in prime working years is about 65% whereas earnings growth of non-managers is similar to the U.S. On the other extreme, we find that in Spain the earnings of non-managers grow more than those of managers over the life-cycle.

We subsequently document that there is a strong positive relation between the relative steepness of age-earnings profiles and GDP per worker: managerial earnings grow faster than non-managerial earnings in countries with higher GDP per worker. The correlation coefficient between the log of relative earnings and log-GDP per worker is 0.49, and stable across several robustness checks on our data. Since better management practices and the GDP per worker are positively correlated in the data, there is also a very strong positive relation between the earnings growth of managers relative to the earnings growth of non-managers and the quality of management practices across countries. The relation between the relative steepness of age-earnings profiles and GDP per worker remains robust when we control for individuals' educational attainment, sector of employment and self-employment status. Furthermore, these cross-country relations hold only when we look at the relative earnings growth of managers vs. non-managers (workers). There is no systematic relation between GDP per worker and the relative earnings growths of professionals (lawyers, engineers, doctors etc.) vs. workers, self-employed vs. workers, or college-educated versus non-college educated.

It is, of course, an open question how to interpret the differences in managerial practices and quality across countries. In this paper, we offer a natural interpretation. Differences in managerial quality emerge from differences in *selection* into management work, along the lines of Lucas (1978), and differences in skill *investments*, as we allow for managerial abilities to change over time as managers invest in their skills. Hence, we place incentives of managers to invest in their skills and the resulting endogenous skill distribution of managers and their incomes at the center of income and productivity differences across countries.

We study a span-of-control model with a life-cycle structure along a balanced growth path. Every period, a large number of finitely-lived agents is born. These agents are heterogeneous in terms of their initial endowment of managerial skills. The objective of each agent is to maximize the lifetime utility from consumption. In the first period of their lives, agents make an irreversible decision to be either workers or managers. If an agent chooses to be a worker, her managerial skills are of no use and she earns the market wage in every period until retirement. If an agent chooses to be a manager, she can use her managerial skills to operate a plant by employing labor and capital to produce output and collect the net proceeds (after paying labor and capital) as managerial income. Moreover, managers invest resources in skill formation and, as a result, managerial skills grow over the life cycle. This implies that a manager can grow the size of her production unit and managerial income by investing a part of her current income in skill formation each period.

Skill investment decisions in the model reflect the costs (resources that have to be invested rather than consumed) and the benefits (the future rewards associated with being endowed with better managerial skills). Since consumption goods are an input for skill investments, a lower level of aggregate productivity results in lower incentives for managers to invest in their skills. We assume that economy-wide productivity grows at a constant rate. In this scenario, we show that the model economy exhibits a balanced growth path as long as the managerial ability of successive generations grows at a constant rate.

A central component of our model is the *complementarity* between available skills and investments in the production of new managerial skills. More skilled managers at a given age invest more in their skills, which propagates and amplifies initial differences in skills over the life cycle. This allows the model to endogenously generate a concentrated distribution of managerial skills. As in equilibrium more skilled managers operate larger production units, the model has the potential to account for the highly concentrated distribution of plant size in data.

We calibrate the model to match a host of facts from the U.S. economy: macroeconomic statistics, cross sectional features of establishment data as well as the age-earnings profiles of managers. We assume for these purposes that the U.S. economy is relatively free of distortions. We find that the model can indeed capture central features of the U.S. plant size distribution, including the upper and lower tails. It also does an excellent job in generating the age-earnings profiles of managers relative to non-managers that we document from the data.

We then proceed to introduce size-dependent distortions as in the literature on misallocation in economic development. We model size-dependent distortions as progressive taxes on the output of a plant and do so via a simple parametric function, which was proposed originally by Benabou (2002). Size-dependent distortions have two effects in our setup. First, a standard reallocation effect, as the enactment of distortions implies that capital and labor services flow from distorted (large) to undistorted (small) production units. Second, a skill accumulation effect, as distortions affect the incentives for skill accumulation and thus, the overall distribution of managerial skills – which manifests itself in the distribution of plant level productivity. Overall, the model provides us with a natural framework to study how differences among countries in aggregate exogenous productivity and distortions can account not only for differences in output per worker but also for

differences in managerial quality, size distribution of establishments and age-earnings profiles of managers. In particular, observations on the relative earnings growth of managers allows us to discipline the level of distortions.

In consistency with the facts documented above, our model implies that lower levels of economy-wide productivity result both in lower managerial ability as well as in flatter relative age-earnings profiles. A 20% decline in aggregate productivity lowers investment in skills by managers by nearly 47%, leading to a decline in the average quality of managers of about 10%. With less investment, managerial incomes grow at a slower rate over the life cycle, generating the positive relation between output per worker and steepness of age-income profiles that we observe in the data. Lower investment by managers magnifies the effects of lower aggregate productivity, and output per worker declines by about 30%.

We then consider a menu of distortions and evaluate their effects on output, plant size, notions of productivity, and age-earnings profiles of managers. When we introduce the size-dependent distortions into the benchmark economy, we find substantial effects on output, the size distribution of plants and the relative steepness of managerial earnings. We show that such steepness is critically affected by distortions, and that distortions can eliminate all differences in the earnings growth of managers to non-managers. We find that distortions that halve the growth of relative managerial earnings (which would correspond to a move from the U.S. to Italy in our data), lead to a reduction in output per worker of about 6.9% – corresponding to more than half of the observed output gap between the U.S. and Italy. As a result of both misallocation and skill investment effects, managerial quality declines significantly by nearly 27%.

We find that these results are robust to the consideration of transitions between managerial and non-managerial work over the life cycle. We do this in detail in the Online Appendix, where we present an extension of the benchmark model with transitions between occupations.

We finally use the benchmark model to assess the combined effects of distortions and exogenous variation in economy-wide productivity. For these purposes, we force the model economy to reproduce jointly the level of output per worker in each country and the relative earnings growth of managers. We do so by choosing economy-wide productivity levels and the level of size dependency of distortions in each country to hit these two observations. We find that distortions are critical in generating relative earnings growth across countries. As a result, observations on relative earnings growth provide us with natural targets to *discipline* the level of distortions. Once we are able to reproduce both the level of GDP per worker and the relative earnings growth of managers within our model, we can assess the contribution of economy-wide productivity and distortions to cross-country differences in output per worker. To this end, we first allow economy-wide productivity to differ across countries and shut down the distortion channel, and then do the reverse (i.e. we allow distortions to vary and shut down differences in economy-wide productivity). We find that distortions alone account for about 42% of variation in GDP per worker gap with the U.S. across countries, while the rest of the variation is accounted for by differences in exogenous economy-wide productivity and interaction effects. The level of distortions that reproduce the relative earnings growth of managers in Italy (about half of the relative earnings growth in the US) are able to generate about 43% of the observed output gap with the US.

## 1.1. Background

The current paper builds on recent literature that studies how misallocation of resources at the micro level can lead to aggregate income and productivity differences; see [Hopenhayn \(2014\)](#), [Restuccia and Rogerson \(2013\)](#) and [Restuccia \(2013\)](#) for recent reviews. Following [Guner et al. \(2008\)](#) and [Restuccia and Rogerson \(2008\)](#), we focus in this paper on implicit, size-dependent distortions as a source of misallocation.<sup>1</sup> Unlike these papers, we model explicitly how distortions and economy-wide productivity differences affect managers' incentives to invest in their skills and generate an endogenous distribution of skills. As a result, we show how data on relative earnings growth of managers can be used to infer the degree of distortions within our model.

Our emphasis on age-earnings profiles of managers naturally links our paper to the empirical literature on differences in management practices – see [Bloom and Van Reenen \(2011\)](#), and [Bloom et al. \(2014\)](#) for recent surveys – as well as to the recent development and trade literature that considers amplification effects of productivity differences or distortions due to investments in skills and R&D. Examples of these papers are [Erosa et al. \(2010\)](#), [Rubini \(2014\)](#), [Atkeson and Burstein \(2010, 2015\)](#), [Gabler and Poschke \(2013\)](#), [Manuelli and Seshadri \(2014\)](#), and [Cubas et al. \(2016\)](#), among others. [Guvenen et al. \(2014\)](#) study how progressive taxation affects the incentives to accumulate general human capital and, as a result, output for a group of high-income countries.

The importance of management and managerial quality for cross-country income differences have been emphasized by others before. [Caselli and Gennaioli \(2013\)](#) was possibly the first paper that highlighted the importance of managers for cross-country income differences. [Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg \(2012\)](#) analyze how the internal organization of exporting firms changes in response to trade liberalization and the ensuing effects on average productivity. [Gennaioli et al. \(2013\)](#) build a span-of-control model of occupational choice with human capital externalities to study income differences across regions. Recent work by [Bhattacharya et al. \(2013\)](#), [Roys and Seshadri \(2014\)](#), [Akcigit et al. \(2016\)](#), and [Alder \(2016\)](#), among

<sup>1</sup> Other papers have dealt with explicit policies in practice. [Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas \(2014\)](#) study examples of size-dependent policies in India, while [Garicano et al. \(2016\)](#) and [Gourio and Roys \(2014\)](#) focus on France. [Buera et al. \(2011\)](#), [Cole et al. \(2016\)](#), and [Midrigan and Xu \(2014\)](#) focus on the role of financial frictions in leading to misallocation of resources.

others, also study how managers and their incentives matter for aggregate productivity and the size distribution of plants and firms. Differently from these papers, we document novel facts on managerial earnings and use these facts to discipline our model economy. Our emphasis on cross-country differences in managerial earnings also relates our paper to [Lagakos et al. \(2016\)](#), who study differences in experience-wage profiles across countries and show that they are flatter in poorer countries. Similar to our findings, they highlight the fact that experience-wage profiles are steeper in cognitive occupations relative to non-cognitive ones. We focus on the relation between relative earnings growth of a particular group (managers) and the GDP per capita across countries, and interpret this relation within a quantitative model.

Our paper is also connected to work that documents cross-country differences in plant and firm-level productivity and size. [Hsieh and Klenow \(2009\)](#), [Bartelsman et al. \(2013\)](#), [Hsieh and Klenow \(2014\)](#) and [Garcia-Santana and Ramos \(2015\)](#) are examples of this line of work. [Poschke \(2017\)](#) builds a model of occupational choice with skill-biased change in managerial technology – managers with better skills benefit more from technological change – to account for cross-country differences in firm size distribution. [Bento and Restuccia \(2017\)](#) document cross-country differences in plant size in manufacturing and develop a model where distortions affect investments in plant-level productivity. In both their model and ours, distortions are amplified by endogenous investment decisions. They use this model to draw a mapping from plant size to aggregate productivity differences. [Gomes and Kuehn \(2017\)](#), like our paper, emphasize the importance of human capital for occupational choice, and use a span-of-control model to study how differences in educational attainments can account for cross-country differences in average firm size.

Finally, our paper is related to recent papers that emphasize the link between managerial incentives, allocation of talent and income inequality. [Celik \(2017\)](#) studies how income inequality can affect the allocation of talent between routine production and innovation in an overlapping generations models in which agents can spend resources productively to enhance their skills, or unproductively to create signals about their skills. More closely related to our paper, [Jones and Kim \(2017\)](#) study a model in which heterogeneous entrepreneurs exert effort to generate growth in their incomes and how such effort can create a Pareto-tail for top incomes.

Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents facts on age-earnings profiles for a set of high income countries. Section 3 presents the model and the modeling of distortions. Section 4 discusses the calibration of the benchmark model. Section 5 presents the findings associated to the introduction of differences in exogenous economy-wide productivity and size-dependent distortions. In section 6, we evaluate the importance of skill investments and transitions between managerial and non-managerial work over the life cycle for our findings. Section 7 quantifies the relative importance of distortions vis-a-vis exogenous productivity differences in accounting for relative managerial earnings growth and output differences across countries. Finally, section 8 concludes.

## 2. Managerial earnings over the life cycle

In this section, we present age-earnings profiles for managers and non-managers for a group of high-income countries. Panel data on income dynamics are available for a small set of countries and even then, since individuals with managerial occupations constitute a small group, it is not possible to construct age-earnings profiles for managers using panel data sets. As a result, we conduct our analysis with large cross-sectional data sets pertaining to different countries.

We use four data sources: IPUMS-USA ([Ruggles et al., 2010](#)), IPUMS-International ([Minnesota Population Center, 2014](#)), [Luxembourg Income Study \(LIS\)](#), and the [European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions \(EU-SILC\)](#). IPUMS-International provides harmonized Census data for a large set of countries. Only few international censuses, however, contain information both on incomes and occupations. The LIS is another harmonized international data set that contains cross-sectional individual level data on income and other socioeconomic characteristics. Finally, the EU-SILC contains both cross-sectional and longitudinal microdata data for European countries on income, work, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions.

Our final sample consists of 20 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. [Table A.1 in Appendix A](#) shows survey years, data sources, and the number of observations for each country. Beyond data limitations, our focus on a set of high-income countries is motivated by the fact that these countries are relatively similar in their aggregate levels of schooling and hence, individuals are unlikely to differ much in terms of initial endowments of managerial ability across countries. In developing countries, factors other than managerial abilities will likely play a role in determining who is a manager and how much managers can invest in their skills. Borrowing constraints, which we abstract from in our analysis, are much more likely to be a factor in the allocation of talent in poorer countries. Likewise, selection into managerial work as well as promotions are also more likely to be affected by family and political connections.

We construct age-earnings profiles by estimating earnings equations as a function of age, controlling for year effects and educational attainment. Specifically, for each country we estimate the following regression:

$$\ln y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 a_{it} + \beta_2 a_{it}^2 + \gamma_t + \phi e_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where  $y_{it}$  is earnings and  $a_{it}$  is age of individual  $i$  in year  $t$ . The coefficients  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  capture the non-linear relationship between age and earnings, while  $\gamma_t$  represents year fixed-effects. Finally,  $e_i$  is an individual dummy variable capturing college education: it is equal to 1 if the individual has a bachelor's degree or higher, and zero otherwise. In this way we




Fig. 1. Age-Earnings Profiles in the US.

account for the fact that countries differ in the educational attainment of their population and could differ in the returns to education.<sup>2</sup> We estimate this equation for individuals with managerial and non-managerial occupations separately.

To estimate equation (1), we restrict the samples to ages 25 to 64, and group all ages into eight 5-year age groups: 25–29, 30–34, ..., 60–64. Individuals are classified as *managers* and *non-managers* based on their reported occupations. Table A.2 in Appendix A documents how managers are defined in different data sets. Whenever it is possible, we stick to the occupational classification by the International Labor Organization.<sup>3</sup> The sample is further restricted to individuals who report positive earnings and work full time (at least 30 hours per week). Earnings are defined as the sum of wage & salary income and self-employment income. Most individuals in our samples earn either wages or self-employment income. However, the samples contain a small number of managers and non-managers who report positive amounts for both types of income.

Fig. 1 reports age-earnings profiles for managers and non-managers for the US. Managerial incomes grow by a factor of about 1.75 in prime working years – between ages 25–29 and 50–54 – whereas incomes of non-managers only rise by a factor of 1.4.<sup>4</sup>

Let the relative income growth of managers,  $\hat{g}$  be defined as

$$\hat{g} = \ln \left( \frac{\frac{\text{income manager, 50-54}}{\text{income manager, 25-29}}}{\frac{\text{income non-manager, 50-54}}{\text{income non-manager, 25-29}}} \right) \quad (2)$$

Our *key finding* is the positive relationship between GDP per worker and  $\hat{g}$ .<sup>5</sup> We report this relationship in Fig. 2. The slope of the fitted line is about 0.57, and the correlation is 0.49. While some readers may view these findings with caution due to small sample size, the relationship between log-GDP per worker and the steepness of managerial age-earning profiles is remarkably strong and is statistically significant at the 5% significance level.<sup>6</sup> Consider countries along the fitted line in Fig. 2. GDP per worker in Italy is about 11% lower than the GDP per worker in the U.S. This is associated with an almost 50% decline in the relative earnings growth for managers ( $\hat{g}$  declines from 22% to 11%). When we go down to Sweden, GDP

<sup>2</sup> We could allow the coefficient on the college dummy to vary over time in order to capture the possibility that skill-biased technical change affected returns to college education. For most countries in our sample, however, we have relatively small number of panels for recent years (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). As a result, allowing the coefficient on the college dummy to vary over time does not change our estimates in any significant way.

<sup>3</sup> An individual is classified as a manager if his/her International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) code is 11 (“Legislators, senior officials and managers”), 12 (“Corporate Managers”), or 13 (“General Managers”). We do not use the more recent ISCO-08, since most of our observations are dated earlier than 2008. Source: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/major.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> While focusing on earnings growth during prime working years is natural, we also considered two alternative specifications. First, relative earnings of managers compared to non-managers may peak at different ages in different countries. In order to check whether our results are sensitive to this feature, we found the age bracket in which the relative earnings peak in each country and used this age bracket as the reference age for computing the lifetime growth of relative income. Second, instead of using ages 50–54 as the reference age bracket, we used 60–64, and looked at the earnings growth between 25–29 and 60–64. Our main results do not change with these alternative specifications.

<sup>5</sup> We use the data on GDP per worker at purchasing power parity (PPP) in year 2000 from Penn World Table 7.1, Heston et al. (2012).

<sup>6</sup> We also checked for outliers that shifted the estimated coefficient by more than one standard deviation, and we did not find any outliers with this particular metric.




Fig. 2. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Managers vs Non-Managers).



Fig. 3. Management Practices and Relative Income Growth.

per worker declines by 23% from the U.S. level, while the relative earnings growth declines by about 70% ( $\hat{g}$  declines from 22% to 7%).

Since higher GDP per worker is also associated with better management practices, there is also a very strong relation between the steepness of managerial age-earning profiles and management practices. This relation is shown in Fig. 3.<sup>7</sup> In countries with better management practices, such as the US or Germany, managers enjoy much higher relative earnings growth compared to managers in countries with poor management practices, such as Italy.<sup>8</sup>

### 2.1. Robustness

We next perform multiple robustness checks regarding country size, the composition of the sample and the regression equation. In all cases the relationship displayed in Fig. 2 still holds, and in some cases it becomes even stronger.<sup>9</sup>

**Country size** We first run our benchmark regression under labor-force weights to control for potential effects associated to country size. As Fig. 4 shows, adjusting by country size does not affect our results in any significant way.<sup>10</sup> The magnitude of the slope coefficient is now 0.49, with a correlation coefficient of 0.47. If we proceed even further, and remove Luxembourg,

<sup>7</sup> The relation is significant at 10% significance level.

<sup>8</sup> The data on management practices is from Bloom et al. (2012), Table 2, and Bloom et al. (2014).

<sup>9</sup> The relations in Figs. 4–10 are significant at 5% significance level.

<sup>10</sup> As a proxy for country size, we use labor force size in 2000 as reported in Penn World Table v.7.1, Heston et al. (2012).






Fig. 4. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Managers vs Non-Managers. Weighted by size of workforce).




Fig. 5. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Managers vs Non-Managers. Weighted by size of workforce. Sample without Luxembourg).

a small country with the highest productivity and the largest ratio of managers' relative earnings growth, the relationship is very similar, as Fig. 5 shows.

*Detailed education and sector controls* In our benchmark findings, we control only for whether an individual, manager or non-manager, has college education or not. We now introduce more detailed education categories that are comparable across countries to accommodate for potential heterogeneity in earnings profiles connected with educational choices. For each country, we introduce dummies to capture whether an individual has (i) complete tertiary education, (ii) incomplete tertiary but complete secondary education, or (iii) any lower level of education, i.e. incomplete secondary, and complete or incomplete primary education. Fig. 6 displays the findings. As the figure shows, the relationship is very similar to the benchmark one in Fig. 2.

In addition, we control for sector of employment (both for managers and non-managers), which might interact with different levels of educational choices. Thus, on top of the cases before, we add dummies if an individual works in the broad sectors of agriculture, manufacturing or services. The results are displayed in Fig. 7. As the figure shows, the relationship becomes marginally stronger, with a slope coefficient of 0.59 and a correlation of 0.51.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Our main result also remains intact if we control for employment in the finance sector, as managerial earnings growth in this sector could arguably be much higher than in the rest of the economy.



Fig. 6. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Managers vs Non-Managers. Detailed Education Controls).




Fig. 7. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Managers vs Non-Managers. Industry and Detailed Education Controls).

*The role of self-employment* To what extent do our findings depend on the fact that some individuals have income from self-employment? We answer this question in two ways. First, we exclude the self-employed from the whole sample, i.e. both from managers and non-managers, as well as only from the non-managers category. In the data, self-employed individuals are either those who state that their main source of income is self-employment, or the ones who have positive self-employment income and no wage and salary income. Many self-employed, especially those who report a non-managerial occupation, have both managerial and non-managerial duties and hence do not easily fit into our categorization. Figs. 8 and 9 show that our results are robust to exclusion of all self-employed and self-employed non-managers.

Second, we narrow the definition of earnings to be wage and salary income *only*. Under this restriction, the self-employed who earn positive wage and salary income – either as managers or non-managers – are in the sample. However, their income from self-employment is not counted as part of their earnings. Fig. 10 illustrates that dropping self-employment income from the notion of earnings only marginally changes our results. The slope coefficient is now 0.61 and the correlation 0.47.

2.2. Are managers different?

The main result in this section (Fig. 2) indicates that earnings of managers grow faster relative to non-managers in richer countries. In the next section, we build a model economy in which steeper age earnings profiles of managers emerge as the result of higher investments that managers make to enhance their skills over the life-cycle in countries with either higher aggregate productivity or lower distortions. There are, of course, non-managerial occupations/professions for which human






Fig. 8. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Managers vs Non-Managers, Excluding Self-Employed).




Fig. 9. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Managers vs Non-Managers, Excluding Self-Employed Non-Managers).




Fig. 10. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Managers vs Non-Managers, Wage and Salary Income Only).




Fig. 11. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Professionals vs Non-Managers).




Fig. 12. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (Self-Employed vs Non-Managers).

capital investments over the life cycle arguably plays a key role. Do we observe a similar relation between the relative steepness of age earnings profiles and the GDP per worker for those other professions?

Fig. 11 shows the findings when we replicate our exercise in Fig. 2 for *professionals* – lawyers, engineers, doctors, etc. – since individuals in this group are likely to be more similar to managers in terms of their incentives to invest in skills.<sup>12</sup> We look at the earnings growth for professionals (instead of managers) relative to the earnings growth of workers – those who have non-professional, non-managerial occupations – versus GDP per worker. We find that there is no positive relation between GDP per worker and the relative earnings growth of professionals over their life-cycle. In Fig. 12, we illustrate our findings when we repeat the same exercise for self-employed individuals – who are often used in applied work to capture the size of entrepreneurial activity in a country. Again, there is no systematic relation between the earnings growth for self-employed individuals relative to workers (those who are not self-employed and have non-managerial occupations). Finally, we separate individuals in two broad categories; those with college education – four years or more of university education – and those without. Our results are illustrated in Fig. 13. We find in this case a small, near zero, relationship between relative earnings growth and output per worker.

Overall, these results strongly suggest that forces that affect age earnings profiles of managers relative to workers/non-managers are rather specific to the incentives they face, and are unlikely to be due to factors that affect all individuals in the

<sup>12</sup> We define professionals as individuals who hold occupations in Group 2 in ISCO-88. Source: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/major.htm>.




Fig. 13. GDP per Worker and Relative Growth of Earnings (College Graduates vs Others).

economy, such as non-linear income taxation. We present below a parsimonious model able to capture these key properties of the data.

### 3. Model

We develop a life-cycle, span-of-control model, where managers invest in their skills. Time is discrete. Each period, a cohort of heterogeneous individuals that live for  $J$  periods is born. Each individual maximizes the lifetime utility from consumption, so the life-time discounted utility of an agent born at date  $t$  is given by

$$\sum_{j=1}^J \beta^{j-1} \log(c_j(t + j - 1)), \tag{3}$$

where  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  and  $c_j(t)$  is the consumption of an age- $j$  agent at date  $t$ .

Each agent is born with an initial endowment of managerial ability. We denote managerial ability by  $z$ . We assume that initial (age-1) abilities of an agent born at date  $t$  are given by  $z_1(t) = G_z(t)z$ , and  $z$  is drawn from an exogenous distribution with cdf  $F(z)$  and density  $f(z)$  on  $[0, z^{\max}]$ . That is, individuals are heterogeneous in initial managerial ability, and abilities for newborns are shifted in each date by the factor  $G_z(t)$ . We assume that  $G_z(t)$  grows at the constant (gross) rate  $1 + g_z$ .

Each agent is also endowed with one unit of time which she supplies inelastically as a manager or as a worker. In the very first period of their lives, agents must choose to be either *workers* or *managers*. This decision is irreversible. If an individual chooses to be a worker, her managerial efficiency units are foregone, and she supplies one efficiency unit of labor at each age  $j$ . Retirement occurs exogenously at age  $J_R$ . The decision problem of a worker is to choose how much to consume and save every period.

If an individual chooses instead to be a manager, she has access to a technology to produce output, which requires managerial ability in conjunction with capital and labor services. Hence, given factor prices, she decides how much labor and capital to employ every period. In addition, in every period, a manager decides how much of his/her net income to allocate towards current consumption, savings and investments in improving her/his managerial skills. Retirement for managers also occurs exogenously at age  $J_R$ .

We assume that each cohort is  $1 + g_N$  bigger than the previous one. These demographic patterns are stationary so that age- $j$  agents are a fraction  $\mu_j$  of the population at any point in time. The weights are normalized to add up to one, and obey the recursion,  $\mu_{j+1} = \mu_j / (1 + g_N)$ .

*Technology* Each manager has access to a span-of-control technology. A plant at date  $t$  comprises of a manager with ability  $z$  along with labor and capital,

$$y(t) = A(t)z^{1-\gamma} (k^\alpha n^{1-\alpha})^\gamma,$$

where  $\gamma$  is the span-of-control parameter and  $\alpha\gamma$  is the share of capital.<sup>13</sup> The term  $A(t)$  is productivity term that is common to all establishments, and given by  $A(t) = \bar{A} G_A(t)$ , where  $G_A(t)$  grows at the (gross) rate  $1 + g_A$ . Thus,  $\bar{A}$  controls the level of exogenous productivity.

Every manager can enhance her future skills by investing current income in skill accumulation. The law of motion for managerial skills for a manager who is born at period  $t$  is given by

$$\begin{aligned} z_{j+1}(t + j) &= (1 - \delta_z)z_j(t + j - 1) + g(z_j(t + j - 1), x_j(t + j - 1), j) \\ &= (1 - \delta_z)z_j(t + j - 1) + B(j)z_j(t + j - 1)^{\theta_1}x_j(t + j - 1)^{\theta_2}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $x_j(t)$  is goods invested in skill accumulation by a manager of age  $j$  in period  $t$ . We assume that  $\theta_1 \in (0, 1)$  and  $\theta_2 \in (0, 1)$ .  $B(j)$  is the overall efficiency of investment in skills at age  $j$ . The skill accumulation technology described above satisfies three important properties, of which the first two follow from the functional form and the last one is an assumption. First, the technology shows complementarities between current ability and investments in next period's ability; i.e.  $g_{zx} > 0$ . Second,  $g(z, 0, j) = 0$ . That is, investments are essential to increase the stock of managerial skills. Finally, since  $\theta_2 < 1$ , there are diminishing returns to skill investments, i.e.  $g_{xx} < 0$ . Furthermore, we assume that  $B(j) = (1 - \delta_\theta)B(j - 1)$  with  $B(1) = \theta$ .

### 3.1. Decisions

Let factor prices be denoted by  $R(t)$  and  $w(t)$  for capital and labor services, respectively. Let  $a_j(t)$  denote assets at age  $j$  and date  $t$  that pay the risk-free rate of return  $r(t) = R(t) - \delta$ .

*Managers* We assume that there are no borrowing constraints. As a result, factor demands and per-period managerial income (profits) are age-independent, and only depend on her ability  $z$  and factor prices. The income of a manager with ability  $z$  at date  $t$  is given by

$$\pi(z, r, w, A, t) \equiv \max_{n,k} \{A(t)z^{1-\gamma} (k^\alpha n^{1-\alpha})^\gamma - w(t)n - (r(t) + \delta)k\}.$$

Factor demands are given by

$$k(z, r, w, A, t) = (A(t)(1 - \alpha)\gamma)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right)^{\frac{1-\gamma(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} \left(\frac{1}{r(t) + \delta}\right)^{\frac{1-\gamma(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} \left(\frac{1}{w(t)}\right)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} z, \tag{4}$$

and

$$n(z, r, w, A, t) = (A(t)(1 - \alpha)\gamma)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right)^{\frac{\alpha\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \left(\frac{1}{r(t) + \delta}\right)^{\frac{\alpha\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \left(\frac{1}{w(t)}\right)^{\frac{1-\alpha\gamma}{1-\gamma}} z. \tag{5}$$

Substituting these into the profit function, one can show that managerial income is given by

$$\pi(z, r, w, A, t) = A(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \Omega \left(\frac{1}{r(t) + \delta}\right)^{\frac{\alpha\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \left(\frac{1}{w(t)}\right)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} z, \tag{6}$$

where  $\Omega$  is a constant equal to

$$\Omega \equiv (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)}{(1-\gamma)}} \alpha^{\frac{\gamma\alpha}{(1-\gamma)}} (1 - \gamma) \gamma^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}. \tag{7}$$

Note that since profits are linear function of managerial ability,  $z$ , the impact of *additional* skills on profits is independent of  $z$ , and a function of parameters, exogenous productivity, and prices only. Also note that given two managers, with ability levels  $z$  and  $z'$ , we have

$$\frac{k(z', r, w, A, t)}{k(z, r, w, A, t)} = \frac{n(z', r, w, A, t)}{n(z, r, w, A, t)} = \frac{\pi(z', r, w, A, t)}{\pi(z, r, w, A, t)} = \frac{z'}{z}.$$

Hence, differences in managerial abilities map one-to-one to differences in establishments sizes and managerial incomes.

The problem of a manager is to maximize (3), subject to

$$c_j(t + j - 1) + x_j(t + j - 1) + a_{j+1}(t + j) = \pi(z, r, w, A, t + j - 1) + (1 + r(t + j - 1))a_j(t + j - 1) \quad \forall 1 \leq j \leq J_R - 1, \tag{8}$$

<sup>13</sup> In referring to production units, we use the terms *establishment* and *plant* interchangeably.

$$c_j(t + j - 1) + a_{j+1}(t + j) = (1 + r(t + j - 1))a_j(t + j - 1) \quad \forall j \geq J_R, \quad (9)$$

and

$$z_{j+1}(t + j) = (1 - \delta_z)z_j(t + j - 1) + B(j)z_j(t + j - 1)^{\theta_1}x_j(t + j - 1)^{\theta_2} \quad \forall 1 \leq j < J_R - 1, \quad (10)$$

with  $a_{J+1}(\cdot) = 0$ . The manager chooses consumption at each age, assets and investments in skill formation. For a manager who is born in period  $t$  with initial managerial ability  $z(t)$ , let the value of lifetime discounted utility of being a manager in age 1 be  $V(z(t))$ .

The solution to the problem of a manager is characterized by two conditions. First, the solution for next-period assets implies a standard Euler equation for asset accumulation

$$\frac{1}{c_j(t + j - 1)} = \beta(1 + r(t + j))\frac{1}{c_{j+1}(t + j)}, \quad \forall 1 \leq j < J \quad (11)$$

Second, the optimality condition for skill investments ( $x$ ) and (11) imply the following no-arbitrage condition for investing in physical capital and skills

$$\underbrace{(1 + r(t + j))}_{\text{marginal cost}} = \underbrace{\pi_z(t + j)g_x(t + j - 1) + \frac{g_x(t + j - 1)}{g_x(t + j)}[1 + g_z(t + j) - \delta_z]}_{\text{marginal benefit}} \quad \forall 1 \leq j < J_R - 2, \quad (12)$$

For age  $j = J_R - 2$ , we have

$$\underbrace{(1 + r(t + j))}_{\text{marginal cost}} = \underbrace{\pi_z(t + j)g_x(t + j - 1)}_{\text{marginal benefit}}. \quad (13)$$

The left-hand side of equation (13) is the next period's gain in income from one unit of current savings. The manager can also use this one unit as an investment in her skills. Hence, the term  $g_x(\cdot)$  on the right-hand side stands for the additional skills available next period from an additional unit of investment in the current period. The term  $\pi_z(\cdot)$  is the additional profit generated from an additional unit of managerial skills. Therefore, the right-hand side is the income gain captured by the manager in his last working-age from investing one unit of the current consumption good in skill accumulation. It follows that one period before retirement, the manager must be indifferent at the margin between investing in assets and skills.

For ages less than  $j = J_R - 2$ , the marginal benefit incorporates an additional term as equation (12) shows. This term appears as an extra unit of investment, and also relaxes the skill accumulation constraint in the subsequent period.

*Workers* The problem of an age- $j$  worker is to maximize (3) by choice of consumption and assets at each age, subject to

$$c_j(t + j - 1) + a_{j+1}(t + j) = w(t + j - 1) + (1 + r(t + j - 1))a_j(t + j - 1) \quad \forall 1 \leq j \leq J_R - 1 \quad (14)$$

and

$$c_j(t + j - 1) + a_{j+1}(t + j) = (1 + r(t + j - 1))a_j(t + j - 1) \quad \forall j \geq J_R, \quad (15)$$

with  $a_{J+1}(\cdot) = 0$ . Like managers, workers can borrow and lend without any constraint as long as they do not die with negative assets. For an individual born in period  $t$ , let the life-time discounted utility of being a worker at age 1 be given by  $W(t)$ .

*Occupational choice* Let  $z^*(t)$  be the ability level at which a 1-year old agent is indifferent between being a manager and a worker. This threshold level of  $z$  is given by (as agents are born with no assets)

$$V(z^*(t)) = W(t). \quad (16)$$

Given all the assumptions made,  $V$  is a continuous and a strictly increasing function of  $z$ . Therefore, (16) has a well-defined solution,  $z^*(t)$ , for all  $t$ .

### 3.2. Balanced growth

We focus from now on the *balanced growth* scenario. In this case, the rate of return to assets and the fraction of managers are constant, and all variables grow in the long run at specified rates, driven ultimately by the two sources of growth in the environment: exogenous productivity growth and exogenous growth in the managerial skills of newborns. In the Online Appendix, we show that our economy has a balanced growth path if and only if initial skills growth takes place at a given rate. We show therein that the growth rate in output per person ( $g$ ) along the balanced growth path is given by

$$1 + g = (1 + g_A)^\psi,$$

where  $\psi$

$$\psi \equiv \frac{1 - \theta_1}{\gamma(1 - \alpha) + (1 - \theta_2)(1 - \gamma) - \theta_1(1 - \alpha\gamma)}.$$

### 3.3. Equilibrium

We outline now what constitutes an equilibrium for an economy in the stationary case, i.e. along a balanced growth path. We normalize variables to account for stationary growth. Define the growth factor  $D(t) \equiv (1 + g)^t$ . Hence, we normalize variables wage rates, managerial income, individual consumption, asset holdings and factor demands by  $D(t)$ , and denote normalized variables by the “ $\hat{\cdot}$ ” symbol (i.e.  $\hat{a}_j = a_j(t)/D(t)$ ). Regarding managerial abilities, recall that managerial ability levels of members of each new cohort are given by  $z_1(t) = \tilde{z}(t)z$ , with a common component that grows over time at the rate  $g_z$ , and a random draw,  $z$ , distributed with cdf  $F(z)$  and density  $f(z)$  on  $[0, z^{\max}]$ . Hence, the normalized component is simply  $z$  for each individual. After the age-1, and given the stationary threshold value  $z^*$ , the distribution of managerial abilities is endogenous as it depends on investment decisions of managers over their life-cycle.

Let managerial abilities take values in set  $\mathcal{Z} = [z^*, \bar{z}]$  with the endogenous upper bound  $\bar{z}$ . Similarly, let  $\mathcal{A} = [0, \bar{a}]$  denote the possible asset levels. Let  $\psi_j(\hat{a}, z)$  be the mass of age- $j$  agents with assets  $\hat{a}$  and skill level  $z$ . Given  $\psi_j(\hat{a}, z)$ , let

$$f_j(z) = \int \psi_j(\hat{a}, z) d\hat{a},$$

be the skill distribution for age- $j$  agents. Note that  $f_1(z) = f(z)$  by construction.

Each period those agents whose initial ability is above  $z^*$  work as managers, whereas the rest are workers. Then, in a stationary equilibrium with given prices,  $(r, \hat{w})$ , labor, capital and goods markets must clear. The labor market equilibrium condition can be written as

$$\sum_{j=1}^{J_R-1} \mu_j \int_{z^*}^{\bar{z}} \hat{n}(z, r, \hat{w}, \bar{A}) f_j(z) dz = F(z^*) \sum_{j=1}^{J_R-1} \mu_j \tag{17}$$

where  $\mu_j$  is the total mass of cohort  $j$ . The left-hand side is the labor demand from  $J_R - 1$  different cohorts of managers. A manager with ability level  $z$  demands  $\hat{n}(z, r, \hat{w}, \bar{A})$  units of labor and there are  $f_j(z)$  of these agents. The right-hand side is the fraction of each cohort employed as workers. Let  $\hat{L}$  denote the size of normalized, aggregate labor in stationary equilibrium.

In the capital market, the demand for capital services must equal the aggregate value of the capital stock. Hence,

$$\sum_{j=1}^{J_R-1} \mu_j \int_{z^*}^{\bar{z}} \hat{k}(z, r, \hat{w}, \bar{A}) f_j(z) dz = \hat{K} \tag{18}$$

where  $\hat{K}$  is the normalized, per person stock of capital and  $\hat{k}(z, r, \hat{w}, \bar{A})$  is capital demand from a manager with ability  $z$ . The goods market equilibrium condition requires that the sum of undepreciated capital stock and aggregate output produced in all plants in the economy is equal to the sum of aggregate consumption and savings across all cohorts plus skill investments by all managers across all cohorts.

*Discussion* We now discuss a few properties of the model economy that are of importance for our subsequent analysis. First, it is worth noting that managerial investments are essential for the model to reproduce the facts on managerial earnings documented in section 2. In the absence of investments, initial managerial ability depreciates and managerial earnings would decline over the life cycle. This stands in contrast with the evidence documented for the United States and other countries, where earnings of managers relative to non-managers grow substantially with age.

Second, our environment offers a natural notion of aggregate *managerial quality*, or total managerial skills per manager,  $\hat{Z}$ . Formally,

$$\hat{Z} \equiv \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J_R-1} \mu_j \int_{z^*}^{\bar{z}} z f_j(z) dz}{\hat{M}}, \tag{19}$$

where  $\hat{M}$  is the number of managers in equilibrium. Hence, changes in managerial quality in response to changes in the environment are determined by changes in the number of managers (i.e. changes in  $z^*$ ), as well as by changes in the distribution of skills. That is, changes in the incentives to accumulate managerial skills will naturally induce changes in

managerial quality. Even if the threshold  $z^*$  is unchanged in response to a change in the environment, the mass of individuals at each level of managerial ability over the life cycle will change as individuals optimally adjust their skill accumulation plans.

Finally, our model of production at heterogeneous units aggregates into a production function. It is possible to show that aggregate output can be written as

$$\hat{Y} = \bar{A} \hat{Z}^{1-\gamma} \hat{M}^{1-\gamma} \hat{K}^{\gamma\alpha} \hat{L}^{\gamma(1-\alpha)} \quad (20)$$

As we discuss in next sections, changes in occupational decisions across steady-state equilibria affect output in different ways. On the one hand, a reduction in  $z^*$  raises the number of managers but reduces the size of aggregate labor in equation (20). On the other hand, a reduction in  $z^*$  reduces the magnitude of managerial quality as defined above since marginal managers are less able than inframarginal ones. As we show next, the resulting managerial quality changes can be quantitatively large in response to policy-induced occupational shifts.

### 3.4. Size-dependent distortions

Consider now the stationary environment in which managers face distortions to operate production plants. We model these distortions as size-dependent output taxes. In particular, we assume an establishment with output  $y$  faces an average tax rate  $T(y) = 1 - \lambda y^{-\tau}$ . This tax function, initially proposed by Benabou (2002), has a very intuitive interpretation: when  $\tau = 0$ , distortions are the same for all establishments and they all face an output tax of  $(1 - \lambda)$ . For  $\tau > 0$ , the distortions are size-dependent, i.e. larger establishments face higher distortions than smaller ones. Hence,  $\tau$  controls how dependent on size the distortions are.<sup>14</sup>

With distortions, profits are given by

$$\pi(z, \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A}) = \max_{n,k} \left\{ \underbrace{\lambda \bar{A}^{1-\tau} z^{(1-\gamma)(1-\tau)} (k^\alpha n^{1-\alpha})^{\gamma(1-\tau)}}_{\text{after-tax output}} - \hat{w}n - (\hat{r} + \delta)k \right\}$$

From the first order conditions, the factor demands are now given by

$$\begin{aligned} n(z, \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A}) &= [\lambda \bar{A}^{1-\tau} \gamma(1-\alpha)(1-\tau)]^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} \times \\ &\times \left( \frac{1}{\hat{r} + \delta} \right)^{\frac{\gamma\alpha(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{\gamma\alpha(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} \left( \frac{1}{\hat{w}} \right)^{\frac{1-\gamma\alpha(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} z^{\frac{(1-\gamma)(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}}, \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} k(z, \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A}) &= [\lambda \bar{A}^{1-\tau} \gamma(1-\alpha)(1-\tau)]^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} \times \\ &\times \left( \frac{1}{\hat{r} + \delta} \right)^{\frac{1-\gamma(1-\alpha)(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1-\gamma(1-\alpha)(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} \left( \frac{1}{\hat{w}} \right)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} z^{\frac{(1-\gamma)(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}}. \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

Using the factor demands (21) and (22), we can write the profit function as

$$\pi(z, \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A}) = (\lambda \bar{A}^{1-\tau})^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} \tilde{\Omega} \left( \frac{1}{\hat{r} + \delta} \right)^{\frac{\alpha\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{1}{\hat{w}} \right)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} z^{\frac{(1-\gamma)(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} \quad (23)$$

where

$$\tilde{\Omega} \equiv (1 - \gamma(1 - \tau)) \alpha^{\frac{\gamma\alpha(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}} (\gamma(1 - \tau))^{\frac{\gamma(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}}.$$

Note that for any  $z$  and  $z'$ , we now have

$$\frac{k(z', \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A})}{k(z, \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A})} = \frac{n(z', \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A})}{n(z, \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A})} = \frac{\pi(z', \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A})}{\pi(z, \hat{r}, \hat{w}, \bar{A})} = \left( \frac{z'}{z} \right)^{\frac{(1-\gamma)(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)}},$$

where

$$\frac{(1-\gamma)(1-\tau)}{1-\gamma(1-\tau)} < 1,$$

<sup>14</sup> This specification has been recently used by Bauer and Rodriguez-Mora (2014) and Bento and Restuccia (2017) in the development literature. In a public-finance context, this specification has been used by Heathcote et al. (2017) and Guner et al. (2016), among others, to analyze the effects of income tax progressivity.



as long as  $\tau > 0$ . That is, for a *given* distribution of managerial abilities, size-dependent distortions produce a more compressed size distribution of establishments and managerial incomes.

Similarly, for any  $z$  and  $z'$  the optimal skill investment is now characterized by

$$\frac{x'_j}{x_j} = \left( \frac{z'_j}{z_j} \right)^{\left( \theta_1 - \frac{\tau}{1-\tau} \right) \frac{1}{1-\theta_2}}$$

It is easy to show that the exponent in the expression is decreasing with respect to the parameter  $\tau$  governing size dependency. Hence, size-dependent distortions also reduce incentives of higher-ability managers to invest in their skills.

#### 4. Parameter values

We assume that the U.S. economy is free of distortions, and calibrate the benchmark model parameters to match aggregate and plant-size moments as well as moments on managerial incomes from the U.S. data. In particular, we force our economy to reproduce the earnings of managers relative to non-managers over the life cycle estimated in section 2. We divide our discussion of parameter choices between parameters that are set directly from data and those that are inferred so the model reproduce data moments in equilibrium.

*Data and parametric assumptions* For observations on the U.S. plant sizes, we use the 2004 U.S. Economic Census. The average plant size is about 17.9 employees, and the distribution of employment across plants is quite skewed. About 72.5% of plants in the economy employ less than 10 workers, but account for only 15% of the total employment. On the other hand, less than 2.7% of plants employ more than 100 employees but account for about 46% of total employment. From our findings in section 2, managerial incomes (relative to non-managers) grow by about 18% between ages 25–29 to 40–44 –  $\hat{g}$  value equal to 16.8% – and by about 25% by ages 60–64 –  $\hat{g}$  value equal to 22.1%.

We note that a measure of capital and output consistent with the current model on business plants should include capital and output accounted for by the business sector. The measure of capital and output discussed in Guner et al. (2008) is consistent with the current plant size distribution model. Hence, we use the value of capital output ratio and the capital share reported in that paper. These values are 2.325 (at the annual level) and 0.326, respectively, with a corresponding investment to output ratio of about 0.178 for the period 1960–2000.

We assume that the exogenous skills of newborn individuals follow a log normal distribution. Specifically, we assume that  $\log(z_1)$  is normally distributed with mean normalized to zero ( $\mu_z = 0$ ) and variance  $\sigma_z^2$ . We let the model period correspond to 5 years. Each cohort of agents enters the model at age 25 and lives until 79 years old. Agents retire at age 65. Hence, in the model agents live for 11 periods; 8 as workers or managers and 3 as retirees.

*Parameters set directly from data* Based on our notion of output accounted for by the business sector for the period 1960–2000, we set the annual growth rate of output per worker ( $g$ ) to 2.6% as in Guner et al. (2008), with a corresponding annual population growth rate ( $g_N$ ) of 1.1%. For our notion of capital and output, given a capital output ratio and an investment ratio, our (stationary) law of motion of capital implies a depreciation rate ( $\delta$ ) of about 4% at the annual level. We also infer directly the depreciation rate of managerial skills ( $\delta_z$ ) from the data on managerial earnings. Since the theory predicts no skill investments at the end of the life cycle, the depreciation rate can be inferred from the observed decline in earnings of managers between ages 55–59 to 60–64. We estimate  $\delta_z$  to be 4.8% at the annual level.

*Parameters set in model equilibrium* At the aggregate level, we want the benchmark model to be consistent with the capital output ratio in the U.S. economy. At the cross sectional level, the model implied distribution of plants should capture some of the important features of the U.S. plant size distribution discussed in the beginning of this section. At the same time, our model should generate age-earning profiles of managers relative to non-managers that are consistent with the data. Therefore we jointly calibrate the remaining parameters,  $\{\alpha, \gamma, \sigma_z, \beta, \theta, \theta_1, \theta_2\}$ , to match the following moments: mean plant size, the fraction of plants with less than 10 workers, the fraction of plants with 100 workers or more, the fraction of the labor force employed in plants with 100 or more employees, the growth of managerial incomes relative to those of non-managers between ages 25–29 and 40–44, the growth of managerial incomes relative to those of non-managers between ages 25–29 to 60–64, and the aggregate capital-output ratio.<sup>15</sup> Note that since the capital share in the model is given by  $\gamma\alpha$ , and since this value has to be equal to the data counterpart (0.326), a calibrated value for  $\gamma$  determines  $\alpha$  as well.

<sup>15</sup> Within our framework, since each plant has one manager, targeting mean plant size determines a fraction of managers. Finding an empirical target for the fraction of managers (workers) is not straightforward. In contrast to the model economy, each plant in the data might have several managers in different layers and hierarchies. In the benchmark economy, about 5.3% of population are managers, which would be the fraction of managers if we assume that each plant is run by a single manager in the data. In the benchmark data used in Section 2 under the classification for cross-country purposes, about 10% of workforce are managers in the United States. Further restrictions on who is a manager in the data makes the fraction of managers smaller, and easily less than the value implied by our model.

**Table 1**  
Parameter values (annualized).

Parameter	Values
Population growth rate ( $g_N$ )	0.011
Productivity growth rate ( $g$ )	0.026
Depreciation rate ( $\delta$ )	0.040
Skill accumulation technology ( $\delta_z$ )	0.048
Importance of capital ( $\alpha$ )	0.423
Returns to scale ( $\gamma$ )	0.77
Mean log-managerial ability ( $\mu_z$ )	0
Dispersion in log-managerial ability ( $\sigma_z$ )	2.8
Discount factor ( $\beta$ )	0.945
Skill accumulation technology ( $\theta$ )	0.881
Skill accumulation technology ( $\delta_\theta$ )	0.049
Skill accumulation technology ( $\theta_1$ )	0.68
Skill accumulation technology ( $\theta_2$ )	0.49

Note: Entries show model parameters calibrated for the benchmark economy. See text for details.

**Table 2**  
Empirical targets: model and data.

Statistic	Data	Model
Mean size	17.9	17.7
Capital output ratio	2.32	2.32
Relative earnings growth ( $\hat{g}$ ) (40–44/25–29)	0.168	0.169
Relative earnings growth ( $\hat{g}$ ) (60–64/25–29)	0.221	0.221
Capital share	0.326	0.326
<i>Fraction of establishments</i>		
1–9 workers	0.725	0.726
10–20 workers	0.126	0.128
20–50 workers	0.091	0.086
50–100 workers	0.032	0.031
100+ workers	0.026	0.030
<i>Employment share</i>		
1–9 workers	0.151	0.171
10–20 workers	0.094	0.100
20–50 workers	0.164	0.148
50–100 workers	0.128	0.121
100+ workers	0.462	0.459

Note: Entries show the empirical targets used in the quantitative analysis and the model's performance. The fraction of establishments with 1–9 and 100+ workers, and the employment share with 100+ workers are explicit targets. See text for details.

The resulting parameter values are displayed in Table 1. Table 2 shows the targeted moments together with their model counterparts as well as the entire plant size distribution.

*Skill investments* In our calibration, the fraction of resources that are invested in skill accumulation is about 0.9% of GDP. Despite the relatively small fraction of resources devoted to the improvement of managerial skills, the incomes of managers grow significantly with age in line with data. Fig. 14 shows that the earnings of managers relative to non-managers in the model are in conformity with the data. It is important to emphasize that managerial skill investments play a central role in the growth of earnings. If we halve the value of the parameter  $\theta_2$  that governs the incentives to invest goods in skill formation, we find that resources invested in skill accumulation drop to about 0.6% of output and the earnings growth of managers relative to non-managers between ages 25–29 and 60–64 ( $\hat{g}$ ) drops from the benchmark value of 22% to 10%.

It is also important to mention that the benchmark model is able to replicate the properties of the entire plant size distribution fairly well, as demonstrated in Table 2. In particular, the model is able to generate the concentration of employment in very large plants. Again, skill accumulation plays an important role in this case. We calculate that if we give managers the skills they are born with for their entire life cycle (i.e. skill formation is not allowed), the mean plant size drops from 17.7 to about 15.7, and the share of employment accounted for by large plants (100 employees and higher) drops from 46% to 37.8%. In similar fashion, if we alternatively halve the value of  $\theta_2$ , as above, this share drops to 36.2% and the mean size drops to about 15.7 employees. Hence, data moments on the size distribution of plants and age-earnings profiles allow us to pin down parameters on the production technology,  $\gamma$ , and the skill accumulation,  $\{\sigma_z, \theta, \delta_z, \theta_1, \theta_2\}$ , while  $\beta$  is determined mainly by the capital-output ratio.




Fig. 14. Relative Age-Earnings Profiles.

Table 3  
Effects of economy-wide productivity.

Economy-wide productivity	$\bar{A}=1$	$\bar{A}=0.9$	$\bar{A}=0.8$	$\bar{A}=0.7$
<u>Statistic</u>				
Output	100	84.6	70.3	57.1
Mean size	17.7	17.2	17.2	16.7
Investment in skills	100	73.8	52.7	35.8
Investment in skills (% output)	0.93	0.81	0.69	0.58
Number of managers	100	102.9	102.9	105.8
Managerial quality	100	93.6	90.1	84.6
Employment share (100+)	0.46	0.45	0.44	0.43
Relative earnings growth ( $\dot{g}$ )	0.23	0.17	0.11	0.05

Note: Entries show the effects on displayed variables associated to exogenous reductions in the level of economy-wide productivity ( $\bar{A}$ ) across steady states. Column 2 reports benchmark values ( $\bar{A} = 1$ ). Columns 3–5 report the changes emerging from reducing  $\bar{A}$  below the benchmark value. See text for details.

## 5. Findings

In this section, we present and discuss the central quantitative findings of the paper. We first explore the implied responses of our model economy to variations in economy-wide productivity. Subsequently, we introduce distortions as described in section 3.4 and quantify their importance. Finally, we evaluate the relative importance of each channel in accounting for differences in relative earnings growth and output across countries.

### 5.1. Variation in economy-wide productivity

We now consider the effects of changes in economy-wide productivity levels; the term  $\bar{A}$  that is common to all establishments. Two main reasons motivate our exercises. First, it is of interest to understand the extent to which variation in economy-wide productivity can affect variation in relative earnings growth across countries. If variation in this variable can account for observed output gaps across countries, can it also account for observed differences in the life-cycle earnings growth of managers relative to non-managers? Second, there is substantial variation in the size of establishments across countries that is correlated to the level of development.<sup>16</sup> If productivity differences affect the accumulation of managerial skills, they can also contribute to cross-country differences in establishment size.

Table 3 shows our results when we lower economy-wide productivity, or productivity for short, relative to the benchmark economy across steady states. We consider three levels of productivity alongside the benchmark value;  $\bar{A} = \{0.9, 0.8, 0.7\}$ . Not surprisingly, exogenous reductions in productivity lead to substantial reductions in output across steady states. When  $\bar{A}$  is lowered by 10%, 20% and 30%, output declines by about 15.4%, 29.7% and 42.9%, respectively. This follows from the

<sup>16</sup> The size of production establishments is strongly associated with output levels across countries. Bhattacharya (2010) documents such differences in establishment size for selected countries. Bento and Restuccia (2017) uncover large size differences between rich and poor countries in the manufacturing sector.

standard effects of lower productivity across the board, in conjunction with the lower accumulation of managerial skills over the life cycle emphasized here. In this regard, Table 3 shows that investment in managerial skills drops from about 0.9% of output to about 0.6% when economy-wide productivity drops by 30%.

As a result of lower investment in managerial skills, relative age-earnings profiles become *flatter* as Table 3 demonstrates. A reduction in economy-wide productivity of 20% translates into a reduction of more than half in the earnings growth of managers relative to non-managers. Relative earnings growth can even turn negative for low values of economy-wide productivity. Therefore, the model has the potential to generate the positive relation between GDP per worker and the steepness of age-earnings profiles documented in section 2 (see Fig. 2).

It is worth relating these results to properties of standard span-of-control models. First, managerial skills are simply endowments in models of that class. Thus, in a life-cycle context, such models cannot account for the relative earnings facts documented in section 2. Second, the same forces that lead to changes in the steepness of relative managerial profiles lead also to equilibrium changes in plant size. Changes in exogenous productivity, as modeled here, do *not* generate size differences in a growth model with a Lucas (1978) span-of-control technology, as changing  $\bar{A}$  has no effect on occupational decisions.<sup>17</sup> The consequences of changing aggregate productivity, however, are different in the current setup. As productivity drops, both wage rates and managerial rents drop as in the standard span-of-control model. But a productivity drop also reduces the marginal benefit associated to an extra unit of income invested in skill accumulation (see equations (12) and (13)). As a result, managerial skills become overall lower, which translates into further reductions in labor demand and therefore, in the wage rate. The net result is a reduction in the value of becoming a worker relative to a manager at the start of life, which leads in turn to an increase in the number of managers. Quantitatively, however, these size effects are moderate as Table 3 demonstrates.

Finally, Table 3 shows that aggregate managerial quality drops alongside reductions in economy-wide productivity: a reduction in  $\bar{A}$  of 30% translates into a reduction in managerial quality of more than 15%. Again, this occurs due to the presence of investments in managerial skills. Lower managerial quality follows from the (small) increase in the number of managers across steady states, in conjunction with lower investments in managerial skills in response to a reduction in economy-wide productivity – see equation (19).

*Output and earnings growth differences* Given the results in Table 3, it is natural to ask the extent to which the model can reproduce the relation between GDP per worker and the relative earnings growth for managers that we observe in the data. To this end, for each of the countries in our data, we select a value of  $\bar{A}$  such that our model economy reproduces GDP per worker of that country relative to the U.S. We keep all other parameters fixed at their benchmark values.

We find that the model predicts a weaker relationship between output and the relative earnings growth of managers over the life cycle than it is observed in the data. While in the data the slope coefficient between these variables is about 0.57, our model predicts a value of about 0.39. In other words, there is more variation in relative earnings growth in the data than what our model predicts exclusively via changes in economy-wide productivity. Output changes driven by changes in economy-wide productivity are not accompanied, however, by corresponding reductions in relative earnings growth as observed in the data. As a result, the variance in  $\hat{g}$  implied by the model is just about 11% of the variance of this variable in the data.

## 5.2. Size-dependent distortions

We now study the quantitative role of size-dependent distortions via the implicit tax function  $T(y) = 1 - \lambda y^{-\tau}$ , as explained in section 3.4. The key in this formulation is the curvature parameter  $\tau$  governing the degree of size dependency; if  $\tau > 0$ , the plants with higher output levels face higher marginal and average rates, while if  $\tau = 0$ , implicit taxes are the same for all, regardless of the level of output.

We evaluate the consequences across steady states of an array of values for the parameter  $\tau$  in Table 4, under  $\lambda = 1$ . For each value of  $\tau$ , Table 4 also reports the implied distortion wedge, measured as the take home rate,  $1 - T(y)$ , evaluated at 5 times the mean output. As Table 4 demonstrates, the effects of size-dependent distortions can be dramatic on some variables. Introducing size-dependent distortions leads to a reduction in output across steady states, an increase in the number of managers (reduction of plant size), and to a reallocation of output and employment to smaller production units. In the context of the current setup, these effects are concomitant with less investment in managerial skills and thus, with less steep age-earnings profiles of managers relative to non-managers. This occurs as with the introduction of distortions that are size dependent, large establishments reduce their demand for capital and labor services relatively more than smaller ones, leading to a reduction in the wage rate. This prompts the emergence of smaller production units, as individuals with low initial managerial ability become managers. This is the mechanism highlighted in Guner et al. (2008) and others. In addition, investment in skills decline in the current setup reinforcing the equilibrium effects on output, size and managerial quality.

*The quantitative importance of distortions* How large are the distortions imposed by different levels of  $\tau$ ? To answer this question, we calculate the distortions borne by large plants at high multiples of mean output levels *relative* to those at mean

<sup>17</sup> This requires a Cobb–Douglas specification as we assume in this paper.

**Table 4**  
Effects of size-dependent distortions.

Size dependency ( $\tau$ )	0	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.08
Tax wedge $\left(\frac{1-T(s\bar{y})}{1-T(\bar{y})}\right)$	1	0.97	0.94	0.91	0.88
<i>Statistic</i>					
Output	100.0	93.1	86.9	81.5	76.5
Mean size	17.7	13.2	10.5	8.4	6.8
Investment in skills	100.0	62.8	42.4	30.3	22.6
Investment in skills (% output)	0.93	0.62	0.45	0.34	0.27
Number of managers	100.0	131.9	162.7	198.6	239.8
Managerial quality	100.0	73.3	57.9	46.7	38.2
Employment share (100+)	0.46	0.34	0.25	0.17	0.11
Relative earnings growth ( $\hat{g}$ )	0.23	0.10	0.02	-0.02	-0.04

Note: Entries show the effects on displayed variables associated to size-dependent distortions across steady states. Column 2 reports benchmark values. Columns 3–6 report the changes emerging from increasing the size dependency of distortions. See text for details.

output.<sup>18</sup> From this perspective, we find that distortions do not increase too much with output. For instance, the distorting factor at five times mean output amounts to 0.97, 0.94, and 0.91, for values of  $\tau$  of 0.02, 0.04 and 0.06, respectively. That is, in all cases the distorting factors differ by less than ten percentage points.

Quantitatively, raising size dependency from zero to  $\tau = 0.02$  leads to a reduction in output of about 6.9%, a reduction in mean size from 17.7 to 13.2 employees, and to a sizable reduction in managerial quality of about 26.7%. The effect on the relative earnings growth of managers is substantial, with a reduction in the slope coefficient ( $\hat{g}$ ) to less than half the benchmark value. Indeed, as Table 4 shows, it is possible to eliminate all growth in relative managerial earnings over the life cycle! A value of  $\tau = 0.06$  leads to a negative slope coefficient. Such change is accompanied by a drop in output of about 18.5%, and by a drastic reduction in managerial quality of about 53.3%.

It is worth noting that the concentration of employment at large establishments drops significantly with distortions. About 46% of employment is accounted for by plants with 100 employees or more in the benchmark economy. This figure drops sharply as the size dependency of distortions becomes more important. At  $\tau = 0.02$ , the share of employment in large establishments is 34% while at  $\tau = 0.06$ , this variable falls to less than half of its benchmark value. The behavior of the employment at large establishments in response to distortions, like other key variables, is closely connected to the importance of skill investments for our findings. We quantify the role of skill investments for our findings in section 6.

How do our findings relate to the data presented in section 2? Table 4 shows that a level of distortions associated to  $\tau = 0.02$  leads to a decline in the relative earnings growth of managers comparable to the level of Italy, as documented in section 2. Italy's gap in terms of output per worker is of about 11% in relation to the United States in the data. Thus, from this perspective, size-dependent distortions alone can account for more than half of Italy's output gap (7% vs. 11%). Overall, size-dependent distortions can generate substantial reductions in the relative earnings growth of managers and can also lead to sizable output losses.

Several papers in the literature, e.g. Poschke (2017), Garcia-Santana and Ramos (2015) and Bento and Restuccia (2017), provide evidence on how mean establishment size differs across countries. Establishments tend to be smaller in poorer economies and with a higher level of distortions. The results in this section imply that size-dependent distortions lower both the mean establishment size and the relative earnings growth of managers. Among European countries, countries like Germany and France have steeper relative profiles for managers (as documented in Section 2) and also larger establishments, while countries like Italy and Spain have flatter profiles and smaller establishments.<sup>19</sup>

## 6. Discussion

We present below two sets of exercises to highlight the quantitative role of different aspects of our model. First, we investigate the extent to which transitions between managerial and non-managerial work matter for our quantitative results. Second, we evaluate the quantitative importance of investments in managerial skills.

<sup>18</sup> Specifically, we calculate the ratio of one minus the marginal rate on plants at  $q$  times mean output relative to mean output. Since one minus the marginal tax rate amounts to  $(1 - \tau)\lambda y^{-\tau}$ , this ratio effectively amounts to  $q^{-\tau}$ .

<sup>19</sup> We calculate that for a set of 15 European countries the correlation between mean size and the relative earnings growth of managers is about 0.38. The size data for European countries is provided by Eurostat (<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/structural-business-statistics/entrepreneurship/business-demography>). The unit of observation in European data is an *enterprise*, which can have more than one production unit and thus, it falls somewhere between a firm and a plant. Mean enterprise size is about 12 and 14 workers in France and Germany, respectively versus about 7 and 6 workers in Spain and Italy (the numbers include enterprises with zero of employees).

**Table 5**  
The role of managerial skill formation (%).

Statistic	Fixed Lifetime Skills		Fixed Initial Skills	
	$\tau = 0.02$	$\bar{A} = 0.9$	$\tau = 0.02$	$\bar{A} = 0.9$
Output	21.2	5.9	24.6	5.9
Mean size	8.6	100.0	18.6	100.0
Managerial quality	24.5	100.0	34.7	100.0
Employment share 100+	23.2	100.0	13.7	100.0

*Note:* Entries show the percentage contribution of managerial skill formation for selected variables in response to the introduction of distortions of  $\tau = 0.02$ , and a reduction in economy-wide productivity to  $\bar{A} = 0.9$ . The case of ‘Fixed Lifetime Skills’ assumes that the age-profile of a manager’s skills is unchanged relative to the benchmark economy. The case of ‘Fixed Initial Skills’ assumes that a manager’s skills at any age are given by the endowments at birth. See text for details.

### 6.1. Occupational transitions over the life cycle

We have so far considered a model abstraction where each individual chooses his/her occupation, whether to be a worker or a manager, at the start of his/her life and this decision is *irreversible*. Thus, our abstraction assumes away potential transitions between non-managerial and managerial work. We ask: is this omission quantitatively important?

To address this question, we first document facts on transitions between managerial and non-managerial occupations in the U.S. data. We subsequently build and calibrate a model economy that allows agents to switch between occupations, and evaluate whether our conclusions on the effects of exogenous productivity changes and distortions are robust to occupational switches. We present the model and analysis in detail in the Online Appendix.<sup>20</sup>

We find that as a result of occupational switches, the fraction of managers grows in the first half of the life cycle, and then remains roughly constant until retirement. Nonetheless, our model – parameterized to capture the changes in the number of managers over the life cycle – predicts that the effects of exogenous productivity changes and distortions on the variables of interest are remarkably similar to the effects we found under the simpler benchmark model. We then conclude that for the questions addressed in this paper, a richer model that accommodates transitions between managerial and non-managerial occupations is not essential.

### 6.2. The importance of skill investments

We now attempt to quantify the importance of the novel channel emphasized in this paper – managerial skill investments – for a host of variables of interest. We ask: how large is the amplification role of such investments in response to size-dependent distortions and exogenous reductions in productivity? We answer this question via two different variations of our model economy. We first consider the case when managerial investments are not allowed, but individuals are endowed with the same age-profile managerial skills over the life cycle as in the benchmark economy. We dub this scenario *Fixed Lifetime Skills*. In the second case, skill investments are also shut down but individuals are endowed with their initial skill endowment at each age. We dub this scenario *Fixed Initial Skills*.<sup>21</sup> We concentrate our analysis in two special values of distortions and productivity;  $\tau = 0.02$  and  $\bar{A} = 0.9$ . These values are close to the average values in our cross-country analysis in section 7.

*Distortions* Our findings are summarized in Table 5 for key variables: output, mean size, managerial quality and the employment share in large (100+) establishments. We find that managerial skill formation accounts for up to one fourth (21–25%) of the changes in output when size-dependent distortions are introduced. This is a significant finding, for investments in skill formation are less than 1% of output in the benchmark economy.

For size statistics, the message is somewhat different; managerial skill formation accounts for a smaller fraction of the changes predicted by the benchmark model when distortions are introduced. For mean size, skill formation accounts for about 9% of the changes under fixed lifetime skills and nearly 19% under the fixed initial skills scenario. For the share of employment at large establishments, skill formation accounts for about 23% of the changes under fixed lifetime skills and nearly 14% under the fixed initial skills scenario. All these suggest that the economic forces behind a standard span-of-control model tend to dominate for predicted changes in size statistics.

We find that skill formation has a substantial role upon the predicted changes in managerial quality. Table 5 indicates that about 24%–35% of changes in this variable can be accounted for by changes in the skills of managers across steady states. In understanding this finding, recall from our discussion in section 3.3 that changes in this variable is affected by

<sup>20</sup> Our alternative model extends our benchmark with three key modifications. First, we allow for investments in managerial skills by managers and non-managers. Second, skill investments are risky as in Huggett et al. (2011). Third, we allow for occupational switches over the life cycle.

<sup>21</sup> For each scenario, we compute a steady state in the absence of distortions and under  $\bar{A} = 1$ . We use these steady states as the basis for our quantification of the importance of skill investments.



the number of managers across steady states as well as by changes in the skill distribution of managers. Thus, while there are large changes in the number of managers due to size-dependent distortions, the ensuing changes in the incentives to accumulate skills lead to substantial effects on managerial quality.

**Economy-wide productivity** Unlike the findings for distortions, the contribution of managerial skill formation to changes in output driven by productivity changes is relatively small (about 6%). Thus, the bulk of changes in this variable across steady states in this case are due to standard forces; the direct impact of changes in productivity on output plus the indirect effects via capital accumulation.

For the rest of the variables in Table 5, our analysis establishes that managerial skill formation accounts for all changes across steady states. This is expected. As mentioned earlier, under a span-of-control model with exogenous managerial skills, exogenous changes in productivity lead to no changes in the plant-size distribution and therefore, on managerial quality. Hence, it follows that any change in these variables in response to productivity changes is driven by the associated changes in managerial skills.

It is worth emphasizing that our analysis has focused on skill formation via investment in goods and abstracted from time investments that imply foregoing earnings. This determines that both variations in economy-wide productivity and distortions affect relative earnings growth differences across countries, as we have shown previously. Note that if, alternatively, future managerial skills depend only on the time (adjusted by current skills) devoted to the production of new skills, the relationship between economy-wide productivity and relative earnings growth would disappear. Changes in economy-wide productivity would affect symmetrically the costs and benefits of time in skill formation, leaving the formation of new skills unaffected. This is a well-known result from human capital theory. In such case, only variation in the size-dependency of distortions would impact the relative earnings growth across countries.

## 7. Accounting for cross-country differences

We investigated in previous sections the extent to which exogenous variation in productivity and in size-dependent distortions affect several variables of interest. We now concentrate on the role of these two exogenous sources of variation for the facts documented in section 2. We ask: what is the contribution of cross-country differences in exogenous productivity versus distortions in accounting for differences in output per worker and relative earnings growth? To answer this question, we perform a straightforward exercise. We select values for productivity ( $\bar{A}$ ) and distortions ( $\tau$ ) for each country to reproduce (i) output per worker levels, and (ii) relative earnings growth ( $\hat{g}$ ). That is, we select parameters to reproduce, as well as we can, the position of each country in Fig. 2.<sup>22</sup> We then eliminate each of the cross-country differences separately, and evaluate the quantitative role of each source of cross-country variation. The average of calibrated values of  $\bar{A}$  is 0.978 across 20 countries in the sample (recall that for the U.S.,  $\bar{A} = 1$ ) and the average of calibrated values of  $\tau$  is 0.028 (recall that for the U.S.  $\tau = 0$ ). The average value for  $\tau$  implies a wedge,  $[1 - T(5\bar{y})]/[1 - T(\bar{y})]$ , of 0.96, i.e. a manager that produces five times the mean output faces an average and marginal distortion (implicit tax) that is four percentage points higher.<sup>23</sup>

Consider first differences in  $\bar{A}$ , i.e. keep  $\bar{A}$  at its calibrated value for each country and set  $\tau = 0$ . Fig. 15 shows the model-implied and the actual relation between GDP per worker and the relative earnings growth of managers. In line with our previous findings, we find that when we only allow for differences in  $\bar{A}$ , the model predicts a weaker relationship between output and the relative earnings growth of managers over the life cycle. In particular, while variation in  $\bar{A}$  is able to generate significant differences in output per worker, the variation in relative earnings growth is more muted than in the data. As a result, while in the data the slope coefficient between these variables is about 0.57, our model predicts a value of about 0.39 – around the same value as in section 5.1.

Turning into the role of distortions, what happens if we keep  $\tau$  at its calibrated value for each country and set  $\bar{A} = 1$ ? Fig. 16 shows the results of this exercise. The slope coefficient between relative earnings growth and log GDP per worker is now about 0.96, much higher than the value in the data (0.57). That is, in contrast to the case of variation in  $\bar{A}$ , the model predicts a stronger relationship between log-output per worker and  $\hat{g}$  than in the data. Indeed, the correlation between data and model-implied relative earnings growth is about 0.90. In other words, we find that size-dependent distortions are *critical* to generate the observed variation in cross-country relative earnings growth of managers.

This exercise allows us to calculate the GDP per worker gap between each country and the U.S. that can be accounted by differences in  $\bar{A}$  and  $\tau$ . To this end, we compute GDP per worker in the model when keeping  $\tau$  for each country at its calibrated value and setting  $\bar{A} = 1$  (the U.S. value), and then calculate the implied output gap with the US and compare it with the same gap in the data. These calculations, for example, imply that about 43% of the output gap between Italy and the U.S. can be accounted for by differences in  $\tau$ . For Sweden, the equivalent figure is 18%. Repeating the same

<sup>22</sup> In Fig. 2, relative earnings growth for managers is negative for four countries (Finland, Iceland, Spain and Denmark). The model has difficulty to generate negative relative earnings growth observed in the data. The calibration exercise, nonetheless, is able to match the remaining 16 countries exactly.

<sup>23</sup> The combinations of  $\bar{A}$  and  $\tau$  that replicate the data differ non-trivially across countries. Countries like Belgium, Italy or Sweden are assigned low  $\bar{A}$  values and positive  $\tau$ 's to account for the fact that they have lower output per worker and lower income growth of their managers compared to the US. On the other hand, the model assigns low  $\bar{A}$  values and negative  $\tau$ 's (i.e. distortions decline by size) to be able to match the data for countries like Germany, France or Switzerland where relative earnings profiles are similar or steeper than they are in the U.S.






Fig. 15. Data vs Model ( $\bar{A}$  calibrated,  $\tau = 0$ ).




Fig. 16. Data vs Model ( $\bar{A} = 1$ ,  $\tau$  calibrated).

exercise for other countries, we find that differences in distortions account on average for about 42% of the output per worker gaps with the U.S. in our data. The rest is accounted by differences in economy-wide productivity and interaction effects.

### 7.1. Discussion: the role of initial managerial ability

In the previous section, we look for country-specific values of aggregate productivity ( $\bar{A}$ ) and distortions ( $\tau$ ) that can produce the observed cross-country differences in the data. We do this by following the standard practice in the literature and changing only these two parameters, while keeping all other parameters at their benchmark values. It is, of course, understood that there are other possible differences across countries. The analysis, in particular, assumes that the initial skill distribution is the same across countries. Recall that we assume  $\log(z_1)$  is normally distributed with mean normalized to zero ( $\mu_z = 0$ ) and variance  $\sigma_z^2$ . A natural question is how differences in initial skill distributions would affect our results.

To answer this question, we consider two economies: one in which the mean of the initial skill distribution is 20% lower and another one in which its coefficient of variation is 20% higher.<sup>24</sup> Table 6 shows the results. Consider first an economy with a lower mean for  $z_1$ . Since the economy is populated with workers which have lower initial skills, output and the average managerial quality decline by 6.8% and 16.2%, respectively. On the other hand, relative earnings growth ( $\hat{g}$ ) increases, but not by much. Managers who start with relatively low level of skills invest more aggressively (as a share of GDP), and their earnings grow faster than they do in the benchmark economy. In equilibrium, in an economy with lower average skills there are fewer managers and more workers (given all other parameters fixed). Also, the wage is lower which

<sup>24</sup> If  $\log(z_1)$  is normally distributed with  $\mu_z$  and  $\sigma_z$ , the mean and the CV of  $z_1$  are given by  $e^{\mu_z + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_z^2}$  and  $\sqrt{e^{\sigma_z^2} - 1}$ , respectively. In the first experiment we simply lower  $\mu_z$  (and keep  $\sigma_z$  the same) so that the mean is 20% lower, while in the second experiment we increase  $\sigma_z$  so that the CV is 20% higher (and lower  $\mu_z$  so that the mean remains the same). In terms of other distribution of skills across a more diverse set of countries, these changes are quite substantial. For instance, the mean math PISA score in the USA is only about 15% higher than in Mexico. Similarly, the coefficient of variation is about the same in the US and Mexico, and only about 10% in Brazil. See Cubas et al. (2016) for an analysis.

**Table 6**  
Effects of initial skill distribution.

Statistic	Benchmark $\mu_z = 0$ $\sigma_z = 2.8$	20% lower mean $\mu_z = -0.223$ $\sigma_z = 2.8$	20% higher CV $\mu_z = -0.1823$ $\sigma_z = 2.864$
Output	100	93.2	100
Mean size	17.7	18.3	18.9
Investment in skills	100	99.2	103.2
Investment in skills (% output)	0.93	0.99	0.96
Number of managers	100	97.2	94.4
Managerial quality	100	83.8	105.5
Employment share (100+)	0.46	0.47	0.48
Relative earnings growth ( $\hat{g}$ )	0.23	0.26	0.24

*Note:* Entries show the percentage contribution of managerial skill formation for selected variables when the mean of the distribution of initial ability is 20% lower, and when dispersion (coefficient of variation) in initial ability is 20% higher (keeping mean ability constant). All other parameters are kept at their benchmark values. See text for details.

contributes to a higher growth in managerial incomes and to a larger firm size. A higher CV of the skill distribution, in contrast, has essentially no effect on aggregate output. Relative earnings growth and plant size are higher, but again the effects are quantitatively small. This is not surprising, as a longer right tail of the skill distribution results in a larger pool of super-star managers who operate larger plants.

Overall, the results in Table 6, while informative about the forces in our model, indicate that even large differences in the initial skill distributions are not likely to generate significant differences in output per worker and relative earnings growth of managers across countries.

## 8. Concluding remarks

We document that across a group of high-income countries, the mean earnings of managers tend to grow faster than for non-managers over the life cycle, and that the earnings growth of managers relative to non-managers over the life cycle is positively correlated with output per worker. To interpret these facts, we develop an equilibrium, span-of-control model in which managers invest in their skills. Thus, the incentives of managers to invest in their skills are central in determining the growth of their earnings over the life cycle. As a result, our model predicts endogenous differences in managerial quality across countries driven by *selection* – who becomes a manager – and by *investments* in managerial skills. We discipline this model with a host of observations on managerial earnings, the size-distribution of plants in the United States and macroeconomic aggregates.

We introduce and quantify the importance of aggregate productivity differences, and size-dependent distortions as emphasized by the misallocation literature. We find that distortions that halve the growth of relative managerial earnings over the life cycle – the hypothetical case of Italy in our data – reduce output by 7%. This is more than a half of the observed output gap between the US and Italy.

Our findings also show that distortions are responsible for the bulk of differences in the relative earnings growth of managers over the life cycle across countries in our data. As a result, observations on relative earnings growth can be used as natural targets to discipline the level of distortions. In a decomposition exercise, we find that cross-country variation in distortions – estimated to create observed cross-country differences in relative earnings growth – can account for about 42% of the cross-country variation in output per worker with the US.

We conclude the paper by commenting on our main empirical finding that the earnings growth of managers relative to non-managers over the life cycle is positively correlated with output per worker in a set of developed countries. We have shown that this relationship does not hold for other groups (e.g. professionals or self-employed versus non-managers), and we now briefly elaborate on potential reasons for why this might be the case, above and beyond the incentives to invest in skills that different groups face. For instance, one reason might be that as the complexity of organizations increases with economic development, multi-layered management structures emerge, opening therefore for the possibility of faster earnings growth for (some) managers relative to non-managers. These opportunities to climb the managerial ladder would not vary with economic development for self-employed individuals, or for those engaged in professional work. Similarly, selection between self-employment and managerial work could be another reason. A conjecture is that in all countries, only successful self-employed individuals make the transition to managerial work, implying that the estimated earnings growth for self-employed individuals relative to non-managers is similar. If selection is systematically stronger in richer countries, due to better financial markets, for example, this would generate a positive correlation between the life-cycle earnings growth of managers relative to non-managers and output per worker. We leave these and other potential explanations for future work.

## Appendix A. Data on managerial incomes

**Table A.1**

Data sources.

Country	Years	Source	No. of obs.
Australia	1995, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2010	LIS (Survey of Income and Housing Costs)	34,202
Austria	2004–2012	EU-SILC	44,426
Belgium	2004–2011	EU-SILC	37,231
Canada	1981, 1991, 2001	IPUMS-International (Canadian Census)	652,124
Denmark	2004–2012	EU-SILC	59,241
Finland	2004–2010, 2012	EU-SILC	97,390
France	2004–2007, 2009–2010, 2012	EU-SILC	65,423
Germany	2005–2012	EU-SILC	76,978
Iceland	2004–2010, 2012	EU-SILC	30,181
Ireland	2004–2010	EU-SILC	24,015
Israel	2001, 2005, 2007, 2010	LIS (Household Expenditure Survey)	22,316
Italy	2007–2010, 2012	EU-SILC	89,420
Luxembourg	2004–2010, 2012	EU-SILC	32,105
Netherlands	2005–2010, 2012	EU-SILC	58,233
Norway	2004–2010, 2012	EU-SILC	49,038
Spain	2006–2012	EU-SILC	77,196
Sweden	2004–2010, 2012	EU-SILC	53,589
Switzerland	2011–2012	EU-SILC	13,105
UK	2005–2010, 2012	EU-SILC	47,197
US	1990, 2000, 2005, 2010	IPUMS (US Census and ACS)	10,928,272

**Table A.2**

Managerial occupations.

Australia

*Before 2001, International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), Codes 11–13*

Legislators, senior officials and managers

Corporate managers

Managers of small enterprises

*After 2001, ASCO, occupation code 1*

Managers and administrators

Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland

Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK

*International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), Codes 11–13*

Legislators, senior officials and managers

Corporate managers

Managers of small enterprises

US

*IPUMS-USA 1990 Occupation Codes 004–022*

Chief executives and public administrators, Financial managers,

Human resources and labor relations managers, Managers and Specialists in marketing,

advertising, and public relations, Managers in education and related fields, Managers of

medicine and health occupations, Postmasters and mail superintendents, Managers of food

services and lodging occupations, Managers of properties and real estate, Funeral directors,

Managers of service organizations, Managers and administrators

## Appendix B. Supplementary material

Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2018.01.004>.

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